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[O]nly if we have some understanding of why in Chinese civilization
it has been an elegant offense to steal a book will China and its
foreign friends know how in the future to discern and protect one
another's legitimate interests.
William Alford'
Few people are as well-suited as William Alford to provide this
understanding. Now Henry L. Stimson Professor of Law and Director
of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard, Alford studied Chinese
history at Yale Graduate School and law at Harvard, then practiced
international law before returning to academia. Like his mentors,
Jonathan Spence at Yale and Jerome Cohen at Harvard, Afford is
adept at producing work that engages and stimulates both China
scholars and non-specialists. The book at hand is no exception.
Though relatively short in length, it is a rich, pioneering study that
sets forth two distinct but closely related arguments. The first, which
makes up the core of the book, explains by reference to China's
* Jonathan Ocko is Professor of History at North Carolina State University and Adjunct
Professor of Legal History at Duke University School of Law, where he teaches courses on
Chinese legal history and on law and society in contemporary China. His current research
comprises projects on the concepts of justice in late imperial China, the concept of contract in
Chinese culture, and mediation in Chinese culture. He would like to thank David Lange of
Duke School of Law and William Jones of Washington University School of Law for being
patient sounding boards.
1. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 123 (1995).
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political culture why "intellectual property law, and in particular
copyright, has never taken hold in China."2 The second, which builds
on the first and constitutes the conclusion, seeks to convince
American policy makers and diplomats that without "further political
liberalization and a greater concomitant commitment [by the Chinese]
to the institutions, personnel, interests and values needed to undergird
a rights-based legality, detailed refinements in intellectual property
doctrine itself will be of limited value."3 Thus, Alford argues, as
difficult as it is for one nation to influence "the enduring values and
practices central to [another] nation's identity,"4 the United States
ought nonetheless to attempt to nurture a new, more rights-oriented
political culture in China.
Afford's persuasive plea for a values-driven China policy may strike
some readers as ironic in light of Alford's reminder at the outset of
this study that, in studying legal developments in China, we should
not assume that our own course of history is necessarily "normal" or
inevitable.5 However, his teleological argument is devoid of the
tendentiousness that might weaken its cogency. Alford's work traces
the story of how an enduring, paternalistic, authoritarian Chinese
political culture, embodied successively by the commitments of
imperial, republican, and socialist states to controlling both the flow
and content of information for the purpose of sustaining state power,
has impeded the development of intellectual property rights.
This argument is at the heart of each of the four basic propositions
the book advances. First, imperial China had no serious indigenous
counterpart to Western conceptions of intellectual property because
of the character of its political culture. Second, late imperial reforms
in the area of intellectual property proved fruitless because the
reformers failed to consider whether the Western models they
invoked were relevant for China and assumed that foreign pressure
would lead to adoption of and adherence to these norms. Third, the
current attempts to establish intellectual property law in China,
"especially the mainland," have failed because they have overlooked
the difficulty of reconciling Western "legal values, institutions, and
2. Id. at 1. Alford uses the term political culture in a general way, without offering his own
specific working definition. Id. at 119. For a brief discussion of how the concept has been
recently employed by others in Chinese studies, see Elizabeth J. Perry, Introduction to POPULAR
PROTEST & POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA 1, 4-6, 10-11 (Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom &
Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2d ed. 1994).
3. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 120. Alford uses political culture here in the same way it is
employed by Elizabeth Perry. According to Perry, a political culture approach sees change in
a culture as "inevitably" drawing "heavily on established cultural repertoires." Perry, supra note
2, at 5.
4. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 120.
5. Id. at 4.
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forms" with the constraints of China's past and present circumstan-
ces. Fourth, despite intellectual property being a central objective of
American "diplomatic leverage," the resulting bilateral agreements
have not accomplished their intended goals because of American
misunderstanding of legal developments in the mainland and
Taiwan.6
These propositions are developed in the book's five topical
chapters, which I summarize in Part I of this Review. In Part II, I
suggest questions that need attention in future research on intellectual
property in China.
I
In Chapter Two, "Don't Stop Thinking About... Yesterday: Why
There was No Indigenous Counterpart to Intellectual Property in
Imperial China," Alford touches briefly on trademark, and barely at
all on patent, before moving to a nuanced discussion of copyright. He
finds that Douglass North's theory of scientific and technological
innovation leading to a heightened concern with property rights7 did
not apply to China, except perhaps when the state sought to prevent
certain technologies and trades from being transferred to peoples
outside China who might threaten the empire. And, though the state
would sometimes assist guilds and individuals in their efforts to
protect trade names and marks, it was concerned less with demar-
cating and enforcing intellectual property rights than with preserving
social order by preventing fraud. However, while Alford ac-
knowledges that "economic and technological factors should not be
ignored" in explaining "why the imperial Chinese state did not
provide systematic protection for the fruits of innovation and
creation," he locates the principal cause in the political culture of
imperial China, particularly "the constitutive role" of a "shared and
still vital past.",
8
As the source of truth, the past validated and legitimated. Poets,
painters, and scholars took part in a process of "transformative
engagement" with the past. Through the study and mastery of the
contents of the Confucian Classics, the citation of which was the "very
method of universal speech,"9 scholars prepared for the civil service
examinations. And just as the state attempted to control publication
6. Id. at 2-3.
7. Id. at 133 n.2. North argues that new opportunities for profit lead to the creation of new
legal institutions, which, in turn, determine the long-term success or failure of a society's
economy. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
8. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 19.
9. The phrase is the late Joseph Levenson's. See id. at 26 n.111.
Ocko 561
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of materials such as calendars, almanacs, and witchcraft manuals that
could be used to challenge its monopoly on ordering the relationship
between man and the heavens, ° so the state also proscribed the
printing of unauthorized versions of the Classics and unapproved
examination preparation materials. In the "interests of fairness and
the maintenance of [social] harmony,"'" the state might intervene to
protect a monopoly over a mark or trade name, but Afford cogently
asserts, "the need to interact with the past sharply curtailed the extent
to which it was proper for anyone other than persons acting in a
fiducial capacity to restrict access to its expressions."' 2 In sum, the
intellectual property constituted by the common heritage of the past
in general, and the enduring social truths of Confucianism in
particular, belonged to the state.
Since the general reader may be unfamiliar with Confucianism, it
is perhaps appropriate to digress here to offer an explanation.
"Confucianism," explains one of its contemporary practitioners and
best scholars, "is a worldview, a social ethic, a political ideology, a
scholarly tradition, and a way of life."13 Although Afford does not
provide an integrated explanation of Confucianism, he touches on
nearly all of these elements while emphasizing the fit between the
social ethic and political ideology. For Afford, as for many of us who
study China, the Confucian cultural inheritance is characterized by
overlapping, interlocking hierarchies of age, gender, and relationship
that are encapsulated in the Three Bonds (between ruler and subject,
father and son, husband and wife) and the Five Relationships, which
add to the Three bonds the relationships between older and younger
brother and between friends. When individuals performed the
obligations appropriate to their status in these hierarchies, social order
was created and maintained. Thus, the family was the matrix for
society. As Afford notes, Confucius observed that one contributed to
government by being filial to one's parents and a friend to one's
brother.
Even if "immutable Confucian culture" was not, as Elizabeth Perry
colorfully phrased it, "forever lurking like a sea monster beneath the
surface of China's political waters,"" this linking of personal to
10. See PHILIP KUHN, SOULSTEALERS: THE CHINESE SORCERY SCARE OF 1768, at 85-91
(1990); RICHARD J. SMITH, FORTUNE TELLERS AND PHILOSOPHERS: DIVINATION IN
TRADITIONAL CHINESE SOCIETY 39-40, 87-91 (1991).
11. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 25.
12. Id.
13. Tu Wei-ming, The Confucian Tradition in Chinese History, in HERITAGE OF CHINA:
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CHINESE CIVILIZATION 112, 112 (Paul Ropp ed., 1990).
14. Elizabeth J. Perry, Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement. The Roles of Students,
Workers, and Entrepreneurs, in POPULAR PROTEST & POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA,
supra note 2, at 74, 86. Perry's quip was directed at the "unchanging China" arguments of
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political values and of morality to politics has served the interests of
China's leaders regardless of political regime. After the fall of
imperial China in 1912, the Nationalist Party leaders, who established
the Republic of China (R.O.C.), employed these linkages both on the
mainland and, after 1949, in Taiwan. Finally, not only have these
connections often been at the center of the political movements
mounted by the Communists on the mainland since 1949, but
elements of Confucianism itself are now seen by some in the People's
Republic as the source of Taiwan's, South Korea's, Singapore's, and
Hong Kong's economic success.15
However, in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, a
fragile Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) concentrated on the immediate
problem of dealing with the West. In Chapter Three, Alford focuses
on the foreign powers' turn-of-the century introduction into China of
intellectual property ideas, a process he calls "learning the law at
gunpoint,, 16 though the implied threat of force figured more
prominently than overt military pressure. Intellectual property was
of negligible consequence until the 1880's, when Chinese merchants'
appropriation of foreign brand names to avoid transit taxes and
combat the popularity of imports led to demands for trademark
protection. Bilateral treaties in 1902 and 1903 with Britain and the
United States satisfied no one, and the Chinese rebuffed self-serving,
foreign-directed efforts to draft more comprehensive regulations.
Before new rules in 1923 afforded some protection, foreigners'
accomplishments were limited to merely periodic successes at
persuading local officials to use their discretionary power to prevent
trademark and copyright piracy and agreement among themselves on
a set of rules to protect against infringing each other's intellectual
property in China. Less intimidating to local officials than foreigners,
the Chinese fared even worse in defending their intellectual property
against piracy.
Why did China make so little progress? Alford describes both
internal and external reasons, but on balance lays greater weight on
indigenous barriers. Chinese officials, Alford notes, comprehended
that intellectual property fostered commerce, and anti-foreign boycott
organizers used brand-name consciousness to mobilize and direct their
Lucian Pye. I want to thank Wendie Schneider for reminding me of this passage.
15. See generally Confucianism: New Fashion for Old Wisdom, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 1995,
at 38 (citing Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, on Confucianism as a positive
element in Chinese development and the rise of the Four Tigers); Beijing Hosts Seminar on
Confucianism, Market Economy, Xinhua [New China News Agency], Aug. 3, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis News, Xinhua File; Li Ruihuan: Confucianism Could Serve Practical Activities,
Xinhua [New China News Agency], Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis News, Xinhua File.
16. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 30.
1996]
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supporters. Despite this awareness of intellectual property, Alford
acknowledges, there was some merit in foreigners' complaints that the
Chinese lacked a thorough understanding of intellectual property law.
However, most crucial, Afford argues, was foreigners' own failure
either to explain the utility of intellectual property or to train Chinese
in how to enforce relevant laws. Still, even, after the R.O.C. had
promulgated a Copyright Law and Measures to Encourage Industrial
Arts in the early 1930's, little enforcement of any intellectual property
rights occurred. Like its imperial predecessor, the R.O.C. focused
primarily on controlling the content and flow of information. It had
no tolerance "of the formalities of law when they interfered with its
political agenda."' 7 Even if the R.O.C. had been more favorably
disposed toward protecting intellectual property, its struggles against
the Communists and the Japanese sapped its resources and attention,
its administrative and judicial systems were inadequately funded,
competent personnel, and professional integrity, and its citizens lacked
an appropriate legal consciousness.
Chapter Four's title, "Squaring Circles," aptly conveys the dilemmas
of intellectual property policy in the People's Republic of China
(P.R.C.) since 1949. Finding in the Soviet Union's Marxist model an
echo of the Confucian view that intellectual creation is "a product of
the larger society from which it emerged,""i the young P.R.C.
replicated the Soviet disinclination to establish purely private
ownership interests in intellectual property. In order to rebuild the
economy after the Civil War, the P.R.C. came to an accommodation
with individual patent holders. By the mid-1950's, however, the
socialist transformation of the economy essentially eliminated private
ownership and made such compromise unnecessary. Over the next
decade, trademark legislation became a vehicle for supervising quality,
not for granting exclusive rights. By the mid-1960's, increasingly
radical policies led to attacks on property rights and material
incentives in intellectual property as well as more generally to assaults
on professionalism and the formal legal system itself If a steel
worker need not put his name on an ingot he had produced, "why,"
asked a popular Cultural Revolution saying, "should a member of the
intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting his name on what he
produces?"19
As China reformed its economic system and opened to the outside
world in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, domestic and foreign
pressures led, by the mid-1980's, to the promulgation of trademark,
17. Id. at 54.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Id. at 65.
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patent, and copyright laws putatively intended to stimulate and
protect creativity and innovation. Critics warned against an anti-
socialist, initiative-squelching, rent-collecting "literary industrial
complex"'2 and suggested that China freely-albeit illegally-import
needed technology. Eventually Deng Xiaoping oversaw a
compromise: a socialist legality with Chinese characteristics that
granted rights circumscribed by responsibility to the state, and, more
importantly, as Alford notes, rights all too often unenforceable for
lack of adequate remedies. As Alford observes, the widespread
stories in the press of infringement actions (brought by both foreign
and domestic parties against domestic violators) might be better seen
as evidence of the law's ineffectiveness than as proof of its thorough
enforcement. In all aspects of intellectual property, but especially in
copyright, where, like previous Chinese states the socialist regime uses
the law primarily to control the flow of ideas to the populace, the
state's conundrum has been how to generate laws that "create new
forms of property without compromising basic state interests.121
Chapter Five describes the process by which Taiwan has moved
from pirating other nations' intellectual property to being a substantial
owner itself. Though the Guomindang regime exercised tight control
of content, it condoned unrestrained reprinting of acceptable foreign
titles. In the late 1950's, pressure from American publishers led
Taiwan, still financially dependent on the United States, to make
some attempts to rein in piracy, but the situation had not improved
appreciably by the 1970's. Moreover, by the 1960's and 1970's, a
global survey of five industries reported that 60 percent of all
counterfeits originated in Taiwan. Highly publicized reforms in the
mid-1980's again had little effect. In 1989, concern over the role of
piracy in its trade imbalance with Taiwan led the United States to
place Taiwan on the Special 301 priority watch list.22 Taiwan and
the United States reached an agreement requiring Taiwan to enforce,
as well as to expand, existing intellectual property legislation. Still,
infringement in computer and electronics continued unabated, and in
an increasingly democratized Taiwan, voices of resentment against
American infringements of sovereignty slowed implementation of the
agreement. To a large extent, Alford argues, only after the 1992
designation of Taiwan as a center for piracy and counterfeiting, and
the attendant threat of losing American markets and alienating
20. Id. at 67.
21. Id. at 76.
22. "Special 301 is a variant of Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act that requires the USTR
[United States Trade Representative] both to notify the Congress regularly of 'priority foreign
countries' failing adequately to protect American intellectual property and to take all measures
needed to address these deficiencies within statutorily mandated guidelines." Id. at 102.
1996]
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American political support, did Taiwan begin to make substantive
legislative changes. Yet, indigenous forces also played a role. Courts
broadened their mandate beyond "the maintenance of order,"' and
all elements of the legal system improved in quality. Moreover, as
Taiwanese manufacturers like Acer began to become technical
innovators rather than contract manufacturers, Taiwan's leaders
realized that without a commitment to intellectual property, Taiwan
could not implement its "industrial upgrading."24
In his concluding chapter on American policy, Alford vehemently
argues that the United States has misplaced its priorities by making
intellectual property the centerpiece of its relations with Taiwan and
the P.R.C. He sardonically notes that, while reluctant to "interfere in
China's internal affairs" by speaking out on Tiananmen, the Bush ad-
ministration had no such qualms regarding intellectual property.
Driven by concern that piracy was undermining the capacity of the
entertainment and software industries to close the trade gap with
Asia, the Clinton administration has maintained the pressure, eliciting
various Memoranda of Understanding, but no tangible results. In
sum, our threats extract short-term concessions but are "incapable of
generating the type of domestic rationale and conditions needed to
produce enduring change."'  In clear, forceful strokes, Alford
reiterates his picture of change impeded by China's political culture:
"A system of state determination of which ideas may or may not be
disseminated is fundamentally incompatible with one of strong
intellectual property rights in which individuals have the authority to
determine how expressions of their ideas may be used and ready
access to private legal remedies to vindicate such rights."26 Yet, as
Alford acknowledges, we may be sorry if we get we what want. For
if in the P.R.C., as in Taiwan, real protection of American intellectual
property awaits "further development of Chinese-generated intellec-
tual property of commercial importance," American companies will
find the problem to be not pirates, but "technologically sophisticated"
competitors.27
II
To Steal A Book's power and elegance arise from its arguments'
clarity. Alford lays out his propositions concisely and develops them
relentlessly. By the end, the reader is persuaded that China's political
23. Id. at 110.
24. Id. at 107.
25. Id. at 118.
26. Id. at 119.
27. Id. at 123.
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culture largely explains the absence in China of intellectual property
ideas as conceived in the West. To achieve this clarity, however,
Alford inevitably has had to make choices about which aspects of his
own broad knowledge of a complex culture to share with readers.
Without, I hope, falling into the reviewer's trap of telling the author
what book he should have written, my comments in this Part speak
to these choices and suggest areas of research and avenues of thought
that future scholars can pursue as they build upon the superb foun-
dation laid by Alford.
The Question of Property
For nearly three hundred years, Western jurisprudence and scholar-
ship about intellectual property have been inextricably linked to
debates about the nature of real and personal property.2 Similar
connections are not as easily made in the Chinese context because the
Chinese tradition lacks the essential starting point, a tradition of
explicit analysis of property and property rights.
Certainly, the fourth-century B.C.E. writings of Mencius and Shang
Yang emphasize that social order cannot exist without properly
drawing and protecting land boundaries. 29  Surviving written
materials reveal changing regimes of land ownership; 0 and court
cases from the Qing period not only contain a rich lode of litigation
over property, but also demonstrate that, as in the West, both law and
custom recognized the principle that adding value by applying labor
could establish an ownership claim. Yet, there is no discrete body of
analytical writing on the subject until the twentieth century, when
Chinese writers began to explore not only common and civil law
traditions, but also Marxist theories. Thus, if we are to refine our
understanding of property (and subsequently intellectual property) in
Chinese culture, we must tease out of concrete historical experience
what is unavailable to us in abstract tomes.
Over the last decade, social and legal historians have extended
anthropologists' pioneering work on family division of land by
examining other forms of property and ownership disputes. Alford
28. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 37-53 (1994); Wendy J.
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1354, 1354-64 (1989); Grant Hammond, The Legal
Protection of Ideas, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 93, 99-106 (1991); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 287-366 (1988).
29. Chang Wejen, China's Legal Tradition, at 235,341 (Class materials for course on China's
Legal Tradition, New York University Law School, Spring 1995, on file with author) (citing
discussion by classical Chinese philosophers on the benefits of clarity in land ownership).
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cites some of the most recent work from one project,31 but much
remains to be done in the increasingly open legal archives that contain
materials on both the late imperial and Republican periods. We need
to ask whether there was a common core of attitudes or a bundle of
discrete but related attitudes toward property rights. My surmise is
that people's attitudes toward ownership, trespass, infringement,
piracy, counterfeiting, and smuggling are contingent. It makes a
difference who owns property and whether property is rural or urban,
moveable or not. If a necessary commodity is available only through
a government monopoly (e.g., salt in imperial China) or priced high
as a consequence of government import controls (e.g., foreign
software, cd's, and audio tapes in the P.R.C.) or in a situation of
market domination by a single producer (e.g., Microsoft), there seems
to be less respect for the commodity owner's rights. That both
Americans and Chinese who would never shoplift a pack of gum
cavalierly copy each other's software suggests that property-rights
consciousness is extremely dependent on the situation. However, to
move beyond surmise and the anecdotal will, as I have argued above,
require extensive scholarly analysis of the exact nature of property
rights thinking, as revealed in archival materials.
Moreover, as the socialist market economy develops in the P.R.C.,
it will be particularly challenging, but essential, to track through cases
the interaction between evolving ownership forms and evolving
attitudes toward intellectual property. A 1988 patent infringement
case from Shenyang illustrates the nature of the problems that have
been encountered. The case concerned collective factories that once
"belonged" to supervisory "companies"-but which are now behaving
as independent actors who seek competitive advantage, instead of as
"siblings" who share everything.32 This dispute demonstrates that an
intellectual creation is no longer regarded as the "product of the
larger society from which it emerged,"33 but the legitimate possession
of its creator. As the report of the patent dispute editorialized in its
31. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 134 n.6. The papers from the first stage of this project have
appeared in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA (Kathryn Bernhardt & Philip C.C.
Huang eds., 1994) [hereinafter CIVIL LAW]. See Mark Allee, Code, Culture, and Customw
Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in a Nineteenth-Century Country Court, in CIVIL LAW, supra
at 122; Philip C.C. Huang, Codified Law and Magisterial Adjudication in Qing, in CIVIL LAW,
supra, at 142; Melissa Macauley, Civil and Uncivil Disputes in Southeast Coastal Ching 1723-
1820, in CIVIL LAW, supra, at 85; Madeleine Zelin, Merchant Dispute Mediation in Twentieth
Century Zigong, Sichuan, in CIVIL LAW, supra, at 249; see also Thomas Michael Buoye, Violent
Disputes Over Property Rights in Guangdong During the Qianlong Reign (1736-1795) (1991)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan); David Ray Wakefield, Household
Division in Qing and Republican China: Inheritance, Family Property, and Economic
Development (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Los Angeles)).
32. See FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], May 31, 1988, at 3.
33. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 57.
568
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conclusion: Methods of administrative interference have to be
abandoned and rapidly replaced by new ones. "Otherwise, even if we
start out with good intentions, things may go contrary to our
wishes. "
Authorship, Priority, and Specialized Knowledge
Justin Hughes has written that, in the West, there has developed a
"set of central ideas [that] are never permitted to become private
property and are held in a permanent common."" Some of the ideas
are ordinary and others are extraordinary, but all are so important
and society so dependent on them, both for their content and as
signifiers, that they become "de-propertized.', 36 This notion-that an
idea becomes too important for it to remain solely the
author's-resonates with Alford's argument that, in China, the
importance of the past precluded restricting access to its expressions.
Certainly, the concept of the author existed in traditional China.
Indeed, the Romantic notion of the author which, according to Peter
Jaszi, strongly influenced Anglo-American copyright law, 37 had its
counterpart in Chinese literati writing about painting. To the
Romantics, a "work is an extension of the artist's personality., 38 For
the Chinese, "to know [a painter's] art was to know the man him-
self,, 39 for "the character of the artist is seen as the core of pain-
ting."'  Each Chinese painting, and each poem for that matter, was
unique, a singular creation and distinctive manifestation of the moral
character of the artist. Yet as Afford shows, because literati poets
and painters focused on their interaction with the past, innovating
"within the bounds of orthodoxy" and the context of past forms,4'
the idea of copyright never blossomed in China. Painters and poets
welcomed copying as a compliment, a recognition that their work
manifested the power of their moral and artistic mastery. The
imitation recognized their success at capturing the essence, or the dao,
of a subject. Painting "in the manner of" tapped into this moral
quality and generated for the subsequent painter his own sense of
moral power. The presence of this power and the gentleman's
34. FAZHI RIBAO, supra note 32, at 3.
35. Hughes, supra note 28, at 319.
36. Id. at 320.
37. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship" 1991
DUKE L.J. 455,456,
38. Id. at 497.
39. SUSAN BUSH, THE CHINESE LITERATI ON PAINTING: SU SHIH (1037-1101) TO TUNG
CH'I-CHANG (1555-1636) 11 (1971).
40. Id. at 182.
41. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 26, 29.
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resistance to the seduction of money,' separated literati art from
that of the mere copyist or the academician who produced work for
hire.
Like the artists, Confucian philosophers were in a constant
interaction with the past through their predecessors' work and the
Classics, "which contained paradigms for social order and had an
absolute claim to trans-historical truth."43 They felt bound "to the
future by a social obligation to communicate their findings and
discoveries"' and, as a public service to others, made available their
own collections of rare books by publishing them in anthologies.45
In all this, the philosophers' approach paralleled the painters', but the
question of who first had an idea or insight appears to have been of
more concern to philosophers. Indeed, in the mid-eighteenth century,
"evidential scholars wanted to determine fairly and accurately who
should be given priority in research."' Some of the scholars who
made these breakthroughs developed a proprietary interest in their
ideas, treating them as the "cultural property of a particular line
within a lineage."47 Through lineage schools, they tried to confine
generational transmission of these ideas exclusively to their own
descent group. Yet more often than not, because of the prestige to
be gained by broad dissemination of such ideas, this knowledge
passed into "the public domain."'
To find stronger proprietary thinking, we must move beyond the
world of the literati. Those who derived their social prestige from
knowledge more arcane than Confucianism or who earned their
livelihoods from technical knowledge must certainly have been less
willing to have their "intellectual property" depropertized. Alford
notes the efforts of guilds in imperial China to protect trade names
and marks, as well as the support they could sometimes elicit from
officials concerned with maintaining market stability and social order,
but I suspect that there may have been greater popular consciousness
of intellectual property rights than we think. Moreover, much of this
intellectual property comprised knowledge sufficiently specialized to
42. Id. at 29.
43. BENJAMIN ELMAN, FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PHILOLOGY: INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL
ASPECTS OF CHANGE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 28 (1984).
44. Id. at 222.
45. Id. at 151. Before the invention of printing, literati made and circulated rubbings of
steles on which the Classics had been inscribed. For a brief review of the publishing industry
in late imperial China, see Evelyn S. Rawski, Economic and Social Foundations of Late Imperial
China, in POPULAR CULTURE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 21-28 (David Johnson et al. eds., 1985).
46. ELMAN, supra note 43, at 223.
47. See BENJAMIN ELMAN, CLASSICISM, POLITICS AND KINSHIP: THE CH'ANG-CHOU
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fall outside the "permanent common." Those who owned and
mastered sectarian religious texts "acquired considerable religious
authority."49 And specialists in geomancy (fengshui), fortune-telling,
and ritual maintained their position in society even as printed
handbooks made much of their subject matter more generally
available because they maintained a "large stock of handwritten
materials" in which their trade secrets continued to reside.50
Among these groups, unlike among the literati, there was nothing
to be gained and much to be lost by freely disseminating rather than
monopolizing their "cultural property." The system of transmission
from father to son or from master to acolyte might be seen as a self-
enforcing intellectual property regime. An apt contemporary example
is provided by a privately owned restaurant in Chengdu that sells a
particular type of beancurd. Since the 1920's, the family has carefully
guarded its recipes, which the grandson of the creator variously refers
to as the family's trade secrets, intellectual property, and capital. In
the 1950's, the shop was subjected to "socialist transformation" and
the family's specialized knowledged "depropertized" by the state. But
since then, the family has returned to its former practice of providing
recipes to outsiders only after the "licensee" pays a fee and signs an
agreement not to compete.51
Thus, I would argue, even if one cannot find it inscribed in codes
or litigated in courts, an intellectual property rights consciousness, or
sensibility, has probably existed in China for a long time. To uncover
and understand this sensibility, we must move outside the sphere of
literati painters and scholars. We need to attempt to examine under
what circumstances various professional texts-coroner's manuals,
contract manuals, magistrate's handbooks, novels, private editions of
the Qing Code-were produced and sold. We need answers to a
broad set of questions: Did the spread of newspapers and the
development of new forms of literature for the "middling classes"
produce new attitudes toward copyright?52 Was being first to market
the only way publishers could protect themselves against piracy?53
49. Susan Naquin, The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism in Late Imperial China, in
POPULAR CULTURE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA, supra note 45, at 255, 259.
50. See James Hayes, Specialists and Written Materials in the Village World, in POPULAR
CULTURE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA, supra note 45, at 75, 108. On geomancy, see SMITH, supra
note 10, at 131-71.
51. Interviews with the owner (July 1993, July 1994) (interviews granted on condition of
anonymity). Socialist transformation also meant that the state claimed the rights to use the
family name in association with the word for beancurd. When the grandson opened his own
shop using his surname as the business name, the city government threatened to bring suit. To
avoid litigation, the man simply added a diminutive before the surname.
52. For an illustration of such a phenomenon, see ALFORD, supra note 1, at 44-45.
53. We know from Evelyn Rawski about the enormous scope and vitality of late imperial
publishing. Rawski, supra note 45. We also need to know how, without copyright, publishers
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Were the "courts" of the nascent late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century chambers of commerce a bridge between the private, guild-
based and public, court-based enforcement of intellectual property?
Finally, how influential was the model presented by the enclaves
under foreign control?
Confucianism, Political Culture, and the Flow of Ideas
Throughout the text, Afford uses Confucianism as short-hand for
a complex body of ideas.55 Though Alford surely did not intend it,
readers may erroneously infer an enduring solidity to Confucianism.
Certainly, there existed a dominant orthodoxy, an "imperial Con-
fucianism" that the state demanded be reproduced in the civil service
examination. There also existed among scholars a mainstream
interpretation of the past. But we should remember not to take the
imperial Confucianism that sought to control the flow of ideas as
representative of Confucianism as a whole.56 The imperial Con-
fucian state was neither as aggressive nor as successful in controlling
the flow of ideas as its twentieth-century successors.
Certainly, the late imperial state sought to maintain both an
orthodoxy and an orthopraxy (respectively, correctness in thought and
action).57 The state could be highly effective in expunging dissidence
if it committed substantial resources to a full-scale literary in-
quisition58  or widespread investigation.59  However, unless
heterodoxy or heteropraxy posed an immediate and concrete threat
to social and political order, or a group of scholars appeared to
constitute a faction with a distinct political agenda, the state tended
not to interfere. On the one hand, it could not regularly expend the
were able to remain profitable and viable.
54. Evidence that chambers of commerce played such a role is provided by a 1921 settlement
by the Suzhou Chamber of Commerce of a trademark dispute. In re Song Zhu Lu Hui, Yi
2/1/882 (April 2, 1921) (available in Suzhou Chamber of Commerce Archives, Suzhou Municipal
Archives). On chambers of commerce, see also sources cited infra note 72.
55. For a brief but comprehensive introduction to Confucianism, see Tu, supra note 13, at
112-37.
56. Tu Wei-ming, for example, argues that the "Confucianization of Chinese society reached
its apex during the Ch'ing... which consciously and ingeniously transformed Confucian teaching
into a political ideology, indeed a mechanism of symbolic control." Id. at 135.
57. On the interaction of these two concepts, see DEATH RITUAL IN LATE IMPERIAL AND
MODERN CHINA 3-34 (James Watson & Evelyn Rawski eds., 1990). On orthodoxy, see, as well,
the work of K.C. Liu, who argues that "the state could effectively mold the culture-defined as
the pattern of meaning-but perhaps only along the lines on which that culture was already
evolving." Socioethics as Orthodoxy, in ORTHODOXY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 53,54 (Kwang-
Ching Liu ed., 1990).
58. See L. CARRINGTON GOODRICH, THE LITERARY INQUISITION OF CH'IEN-LUNG (1966);
R. KENT Guy, THE EMPEROR'S FOUR TREASURES: SCHOLARS AND THE STATE IN THE LATE
CH'IEN-LUNG ERA (1987); ZHONGGUO JJNSHU DAGUAN [A COMPLETE INTRODUCTION TO
CHINESE BANNED BOOKS] (An Pingqiu & Zhang Peiheng eds., 1990).
59. See generally KUHN, supra note 10.
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required money and bureaucratic energy. On the other hand, except
in times of extraordinary crisis, the late imperial state, as Alford
demonstrates, was highly confident of the hegemonic power of its
orthodox Confucian ideology.
Thus, until the Qing dynasty partially blamed the fall of the
preceding Ming dynasty (1368-1644) on Wang Yangming's intuitionist
attack on conventional Confucianism, other scholars-but not the
state-combatted Wang's philosophical heresies. The political
implications of the views espoused by the late Ming academies, not
their unorthodox Confusianism, prompted the government's hostility.
In the early Qing, independent writers who prepared study aids
published by private bookshops influenced civil service examinations.
The government never fully succeeded in having only authorized
official selections printed.' By the mid-eighteenth century the
kaozheng school of evidential scholarship challenged (correctly) the
authenticity of the versions of the Classics that undergirded the
dominant Confucian ideology, thereby laying the foundation for late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century scholars' "rejection of the
entire Confucian legacy."'" Yet until these ideas constituted a
manifest threat, the government did not attempt to silence their
advocates. In sum, the paternalist political culture of late imperial
China accommodated the flow of a broad-albeit not un-
limited-spectrum of information.
The political cultures in the party-states of the R.O.C. and the
P.R.C. have condoned a much narrower range of views. The R.O.C.
benchmark of truth was the thought of Sun Yatsen, its first president
and the founder of the Nationalist Party. However, the R.O.C. lacked
the capacity to fully control the flow and content of information until
after the government fled to Taiwan. There, as Alford shows, it
created a system of copyright registration that not only generated
funding for censorship administration but also served as a sieve
filtering out unwanted ideas. The P.R.C. uses a similar system that
withholds copyright protection "from works the publication or
distribution of which is prohibited by law"62 and permits publication
of materials only after the authorities have reviewed the content and
issued a "registration number."'
60. Kai-wing Chow, Discourse, Examination, and Local Elite: The Invention of the Tung-
ch'eng School in Ch'ing China, in EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA, 1600-
1900, at 185, 192 (Benjamin Elman & Alexander Woodside eds., 1994).
61. ELMAN, supra note 43, at 113, 32.
62. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK OF LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 199 (1994) (quoting Copyright Law of the P.R.C., art. 4).
63. A literal translation of the Chinese term is book number. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 79.
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Certainly, the primary goal of the P.R.C.'s regulations is to
censor,64 and, Alford argues, "a system of state determination of
which ideas may or may not be disseminated is fundamentally
incompatible with one of strong intellectual property rights in which
individuals have the authority to determine how expressions of their
ideas may be used and ready access to private legal remedies to
vindicate such rights.165  Yet this process of pre-publication
registration suggests how, as the P.R.C. develops a socialist market
economy, it intends to create a system of strong intellectual property
rights for approved ideas. The key is registration. Just as paying
taxes on a land transaction in imperial China made a claim litigable,
pre-publication registration is the mark of the socialist state's
cognizance of ownership and the right to seek protection of it in the
courts. Dissident works, to the extent that they get published at all,
are left unprotected; and the Chinese can claim to have created
intellectual property rights with "Chinese characteristics."
Precisely because copyright can cut two ways, either opening or
closing the flow of information, some scholars are inclined to the view
that less, rather than more, copyright is conducive to open society.
Peter Jaszi observes that a basic contradiction inheres in copyright: It
aims to encourage production and dissemination of works, yet confers
on their creators "the power to restrict or deny distribution., 66 In
a talk on the metaphor of the frontier in the information age, James
Boyle also touched on this point.67 To settle the frontier is to
demarcate, enclose, and curtail the very openness, freedom and
opportunity that attracted settlers in the first place. Self-policing,
decentralized, democratic structures are soon replaced by rule-making,
corporate institutions discomfited by the alleged chaos and disorder
of the frontier. Boyle was not opposed to rules per se, but called for
ones that permitted maximum use of society's store of intellectual
property-a large "permanent common." Similarly, Rosemary
Coombe argues that intellectual property, especially trademark and
copyright, by depriving us "of the optimal cultural conditions for
dialogic practice," impedes debate, thereby producing a less open
64. For example, the Liaoning Provincial Government fined the publisher of an unauthorized
translation of a Danielle Steel novel, not for violating the original's copyright, but for bypassing
registration in order to sell a text with "inappropriate content." Interview with Chen Dayang,
freelance translator, in Raleigh, N.C. (Sept. 1988).
65. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 119.
66. Jaszi, supra note 37, at 463.
67. James Boyle, The Frontier as Metaphor in the Information Age, Address at the Duke
University Frontiers of Legal Thought Symposium on Law in the Information Age: The First
Amendment, Privacy and Electronic Networks (Jan. 27, 1995).
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society.6 Strong property rights may be a bulwark for protecting
individual liberties against the state. But, if property rights are too
strong, powerful individuals or groups may use them to suppress the
marginal or powerless.
This notion of wielding intellectual property as a club against the
disadvantaged may partially explain the blithe disregard in the P.R.C.
and the R.O.C. for American trademarks and copyrights. On both
sides of the Taiwan Straits, Alford makes clear, resentment against
American bullying runs high. On the mainland, there is strong
sentiment that "the world [that is, the West] owes China something"
for past humiliations. Scholars see clashes such as the one over
intellectual property not as cultural but as economic conflicts.
69
Thus, intellectual property pirates know full well that their conduct is
illegal, but some Chinese may think appropriating American
intellectual property is a justifiable act of self-defense against
economic imperialism. Or, to put it more colorfully: "To screw
foreigners is patriotic. '  A more benign explanation might be that
Chinese counterfeiters are simply using the iconographic power of a
foreign trademark to lend cachet to their product.71 But in any case,
as Afford emphatically demonstrates, rights consciousness of any sort
cannot develop in a political culture that suppresses rather than
nurtures negotiation and struggle over meaning.
The Role of Courts
Over the last several years, as case materials from late-imperial and
Republican China have become available, American and Chinese
researchers have begun to produce a body of archival-based scholar-
ship that demonstrates greater use of courts and quasi-judicial
institutions (e.g., the "courts" of chambers of commerce) than
previously assumed.72 Aford cites this literature, but may underes-
68. Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1860, 1866 (1991).
69. Geremie Barmd, To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic: China's Avant-Garde Nationalists, 34
CHINA J. 213, 216 (1995).
70. Id. at 209. The original use of the phrase denoted the physical act of screwing. Barmd
and I use it more generally in the figurative sense.
71. It is important to distinguish among the different kinds of pirating and counterfeiting.
For example, several years ago one would see in China t-shirts for teams such as the Houston
Bulls with pictures of baseball players. The intent here was to use English names to increase
the attractiveness of the shirt, much as putting the Hooters NASCAR logo on baseball caps does
today. From conversations with purchasers of these items, it is clear consumers are utterly
unaware of any significance or lack thereof in these trademarks. However, purchasers of
products with the Motorola, Disney, Casio, or IBM logos or the brand names of high quality
Chinese liquors anticipate that the trademark represents value. It is the intent of counterfeiters
to use those implications to deceive the customer.
72. See generally Ma Min, Judicial Authority and the Chamber of Commerce: Merchant
Dispute Mediation and Adjudication in Suzhou City in the Late Qing, Address at Luce
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timate the extent of this phenomena, especially for the Republican-
period.73 The Number Two Historical Archives in Nanjing possesses
an enormous documentary record of proceedings from Republican
period judicial and quasi-judicial institutions at both the national and
provincial levels. My survey of the catalogues and perusal of some
cases suggests that these materials can help us understand how the
Chinese thought about property and intellectual property issues, how
foreign ideas and pressures affected China's legal culture, and how
much access there was outside major metropolitan areas to viable
courts, competent judges, and Western-trained lawyers. The view of
British expatriates in China that courts "reached decisions irrespective
of the existence of duly registered trademarks,, 74  needs to be
reviewed in light of the arguments and decisions in these records.
Whatever new findings researchers may make, they are unlikely to
challenge Alford's analysis that the Guomindang had little ap-
preciation of a strong, independent legal system. Nevertheless, if
courts exist and offer an iota of procedural and substantive justice, the
Chinese, just as other people, will turn to them as a last resort to
manage conflict. They will turn to them even in chaotic times on the
cusp of political change that will render the courts' decisions moot,
75
and even if the courts cannot fully protect citizens' civil and political
rights because property rights take precedence. Either for want of
will or capacity, the courts may not be able to enforce these decisions,
but use of courts may create habits and expectations that can, in turn,
lead to greater civil and political rights.76
Conference Symposium at UCLA on "Code and Practice in Imperial Chinese Law" (Aug. 8-10,
1993). Professor Ma also has a forthcoming monograph on the Suzhou Chamber of Commerce.
The Suzhou Municipal Archives has compiled an unpublished three-volume set of materials on
the Suzhou Chamber. Kwang Man Bun discusses the conflict processing work of the Tianjin
Chamber of Commerce in The Merchant World of Tianjin: Society and Economy of a Chinese
City (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University). On chambers of commerce
in general, see Yu HEPING, ZAOQJ SHANGHUI YU ZHONGGUO XIANDAi HUA [EARLY
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND CHINA'S MODERNIZATION] (1993). The Liaoning Provincial
Archives contains substantial holdings from the Fengtian Chamber of Commerce. LIAONING
SHENG DANG'AN GUAN ZHINAN [A GUIDE TO THE LIAONING PROVINCIAL ARCHIVES] 67
(1993).
73. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 148 n.154.
74. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 53. The public catalogue for the Number Two Archives is a
mere hint of the richness of the actual holdings. See ZHONGGUO DI'ER LISHI DANG'AN GUAN
JIANMING ZHINAN [A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE SECOND HISTORICAL ARCHIVES OF CHINA] 103-07
(1987). Mary Buck is drawing on these materials for a dissertation at Harvard on judicial
reasoning.
75. For example, a case of administration litigation over water usage was still being fought
out in October 1949. See, e.g., Case 29.147, Administrative Courts, Number Two Historical
Archives, Nanjing. Such behavior is of course not peculiar to China. Paul Haagen, my
colleague at Duke, has recently come across cases from Atlanta on the eve of its fall to Sherman
in which ownership disputes over slaves were still being litigated.
76. Cf. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 120. I make this point more fully in Jonathan Ocko,
Introduction to Special Issue on Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law, 52 LAW &
576
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This is why it will be important for us to track carefully the
decisions on intellectual property that issue from courts in Taiwan and
the P.R.C. By looking at those that are solely domestic as well as
those that involve American parties, we can begin to construct an
understanding of the legal sensibility and reasoning being applied: Is
it rights-based; is it being shaped by indigenous or international
values; are local courts insulated from domestic administrative
pressures and foreign policy concerns; do courts understand what
intellectual property is? The evidence to date, ably presented by
Alford, is that, in the P.R.C. administrative intervention and un-
familiarity with intellectual property concepts remain major problems.
Moreover, on both sides of the Taiwan straits, foreign and domestic
parties are victimized by courts' protection of local interests. 77
The case of Kellogg's Corn Flakes is illustrative on several
points.78 Soon after successfully establishing the product in southern
China, Kellogg's discovered a Chinese company selling a cereal in
packaging that was nearly identical to its own. The Chinese brand
name, a transliteration of Kellogg's, was written in Kellogg's
distinctive script. Every statement on the box, including the
copyrighted slogans was precisely replicated. The only visible
difference was the picture of the Chinese product, which looked more
like Frito's than corn flakes. At the court of first instance, Kellogg's
lost its case for trademark infringement. Relying on a tendentious
line of reasoning and reading of the evidence, the local court not only
found for the defendant, but also ordered Kellogg's to pay court costs
and damages. Kellogg's appealed to the provincial high court, which,
soon after the U.S. and China signed an intellectual property
Memorandum of Understanding in February 1995, overturned the
initial decision.79 Though it provided sound legal reasons, one also
wonders whether the high court acted without instruction from
political authorities. At least in this instance, the absence of complete
judicial independence may have proved salutary for U.S. businesses.
III
For the China specialist, To Steal a Book is a stimulating, challen-
ging work whose findings touch on a number of central questions.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 17-22 (1989). See also Stanley Lubman, Introduction: The Future of
Chinese Law, 141 CHINA Q. 1, 20 (1995).
77. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 91-92. Interview with Supreme Court judge from Taiwan, in
Durham, N.C. (Feb. 1, 1996) (interview granted on condition of anonymity).
78. Interview with Li Jingbing, partner in the Beijing Beidou Firm, which represented
Kellogg's, in Beijing, China (Mar. 10, 1995).
79. On the MOU, see the testimony to Congress of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky, NEXIS, News/Curnews, (Mar. 2, 1995).
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Although I have minor disagreements with some conclusions and feel
that at times Alford's emphasis on an enduring Chinese political
culture leads him to forget briefly his own warning-"at no time is
any society's culture monolithic" 8°-I still offer it an academic's
highest praise: I commend To Steal a Book to the non-specialist as an
engaging, reliable guide to complex issues such as Chinese and
comparative intellectual property, Sino-foreign legal interaction, and
current American trade policy toward China. Alford's work reminds
the non-specialist that, despite the current focus on bilateral tensions
and American losses, the course of intellectual property law in China
has been and will be shaped by China's political culture and by the
rights and interests of Chinese authors, inventors, and companies.
One hopes that when Professor Afford completes his current
research on the impact of American legal education on a generation
of Chinese lawyers and jurists, he will return to the subject of
intellectual property. In the meantime, one expects that many
readers, like the Chinese literati Afford discusses, will be paying his
book the ultimate compliment, and making "fair use" of it in their
own work.
80. ALFORD, supra note 1, at 6.
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